
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POSITION OF GEORGE W. BALL

I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strik
mare too great for us to undertake. I have, therefore, con
cluded that the blockade plan -- while by no means wholly
satisfactory -- is the course we should follow.

In reaching this conclusion I have begun with the Cassumption that the Soviet nuclear build-up in Cuba does not add appreciably to the Soviet ability to impose destruction on the United States. The Soviet Union already has a substantial number of ICBM's targeted on American installations. For the time being the slight additional inorganized of destructive capacity provided by the MEDM's and HEDM's Cuba might have some marginal significance. As the Sevice Union accumulates additional numbers of ICBM's even this transitory advantage will tend to disappear.

If this assumption be valid -- and I have heard no compelling arguments against it -- then the menace we face is not the addition of new Soviet military capabilities so much as their moral and propagands advantage. As I understand it, the proponents of the strike plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world. Unless the United States is prepared to use daidsive military power, the world will lose confidence in our strength and determination.

But I think that -- far from establishing my moral.

But I think that -- far from establishing our moral strength -- we would, in fact, alienate a great part of the straight would, in fact, alienate a great part of the straight would by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to east simplify alleast everything a course of action that would east simplify alleast everything we have stood for during east simplify alleast everything we have stood for during east satisfied Mastory, and condems us as hypocrites in the epithen of sim world.

We tried Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Fearl Barbor. We condemned the Soviet action in Hungary. We took a strong moral line against the use of force by the French and British at Sues when the felt their vital interests were threatened. We have taken strong line in the United Nations and in other world counce against the dangers of a surpise attack with muclear weapon

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It is my strongly held view that we cannot launch a surprise attack against Cube without destroying our moral position and aliemating our friends and allies. If we were to do so we would wake up the fellowing morning to find that we had brought down in ruins the structure of alliences and arrangements and that our whole post-war effort of trying to organise the combined strength of the Free World was in shards and tatters.

I find the blockede plan unsatisfactory -- primarily because it does not provide a way to present the Seviet. ... missiles from becoming operational. But, on the assemption I have stated above, I do not believe that this is a conclusive argument against it. While the blockede may asseme arickiness with other Free World nations, it will be seen arickiness with other Free World nations, it will be seen arickiness with other Free World nations, it will be seen within a relatively short time, bring the Cuben can, within a relatively short time, bring the Cuben economy to a sereeching helt. Meanwhile, the Seviet Union will have the choise either of running the blockade or of accepting it with the intention of creating a counterthrust elsembers. If it accepts the blockade the Cubens will feel isolated and departed and I think the days of the Castro regime will be numbered.

